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designated individual airport, the better course would be to allow
the FAA to make the tentative decision to "un-preempt" the field.
This FAA decision would be "reviewable" by Congress, which can
at any time act to expressly preempt local authority. 82 Furthermore,
airlines would be quick to contest any overly restrictive local law on
the ground that it would conflict with existing federal policy.
Recognition of the agency role in preemption policy-making
would bring the Court a long way toward the development of a
realistic approach to the nature of administrative authority. 83 In a
time of increasing demands on local airport proprietors to reduce
environmental noise pollution, the Supreme Court would do well to
defer to the FAA determination of the division between federal and
state authority where Congress has not expressly spoken on preemp-
tion. Such an approach would give the Court a means of preventing
needless preemption of local regulations consistent with congres-
sional purposes, without eroding the principles enunciated in Bur-
bank.
DAVID STRAUSS
Labor Law—Pre-Hire Contracts in the Construction
Industry—Operating Engineers Local 150 v. NLRB (R.I. Smith
Construction Co.). '—Local 150 brought an unfair labor practice
action against R.J. Smith (the employer) alleging a. refusal to bargain
in violation of section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act
(the Act). 2 The employer had unilaterally increased selected em-
ployees' wage rates during the term of its contract with Local 150
and had failed to bring wage rates up to the level agreed upon in the
contract. 3 The relevant details of the bargaining relationship be-
82 One alternative to "un-preemption" would be to permit municipal proprietors to
establish the same regulations as those promulgated for each airport by the FAA. Cf.
California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949). This approach would also allow enforcement by the
proprietor, although not on the selective basis the FAA has previously employed. An added
advantage of giving all municipal airport proprietors the power to enforce concurrent regula-
tions is that liability would be less likely to shift from the proprietor to the federal govern-
ment, thus maintaining the local incentive to control noise. Such en approach, however, also
depends on the assertion that a finding of pervasiveness does not prevent the FAA from
sanctioning complementary regulation.
83 The FAA has been making such de facto preemption decisions throughout its history.
It has chosen to permit the New York Port Authority, for example, to enforce the same types
of regulations recommended by the EPA. See note 52 supra.
1 480 F.2d 1186, 83 L.R.R.M. 2706 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The statement of facts set forth
below is taken from id. at 1187-88, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2707-08.
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970) provides; "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer— ... (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section I59(a) of this title."
3 Local 150 also alleged a violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and (3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(01), (3) (1970),
m in the company's discharge of the only two union workers in the employer's fairly stable
862
CASE NOTES
tween Local 150 and the employer were as follows. The employer
was a contractor in the building and construction industry and Local
150 represented employees in that industry. A history of bargaining
between these two parties dated back to 1964. 4 In October 1968, the
parties entered into two new collective bargaining agreements, for
violation of which Local 150 brought its allegations of unfair labor
practices. Although each of these contracts purported to recognize
Local 150 as exclusive bargaining agent for R.J. Smith's employees,
at no time did the union petition the National Labor Relations
Board (the Board or NLRB) to hold a representation election so that
it might prove its majority support and become certified to bargain
in the usual manner. 5 At least one of the agreements contained
union security provisions which required membership in the union
after the seventh day on the job as a condition of employment. 6
Such clauses normally operate to ensure that the union achieves and
maintains majority status. However, at no time since the beginning
of the bargaining relationship in 1964 did Local 150 actually repre-
sent or even claim to represent a majority of the employees.
Despite its lack of Board certification or actual majority status,
Local 150 claimed that the contracts were binding agreements under
the "pre-hire" contract provision of section 8(0 of the Act, providing
for special treatment of collective bargaining in the construction
industry.' Under section 9 of the Act, unions in other industries
must be selected as bargaining representatives by a majority of the
complement of thirteen to fourteen workers. However, the company did not challenge this
allegation and the employees were reinstated two weeks later with full back pay. They
became the only employees in the unit to receive full contract wages and fringe benefits. 480
F.2d at 1188 n.1, 83 L.R.R,M.'at 2707-08 n.1,
4 The employer and Local 150 had entered into a collective bargaining agreement in 1964
which adopted the terms of a master agreement between Local 150 and an employers'
association. The company never complied with the terms of this contract and, according to its
president, never intended to do so. When the contract expired in Jan. 1966, chronic disagree-
ments prevented a renewal, although there is some evidence that both parties believed that a
new contract between them did exist. See 191 N.L.R.B. No. 135, at 3 (trial examiner's
opinion), 77 L.R.R.M. 1493 (1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 1186, 83 L.R.R.M. 2706 (I). C. Cir. 1973).
5 Section 9(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970), sets out the procedure for
certification. See generally Section of Labor Relations Law, American Bar Ass'n, The De-
veloping Labor Law 153-99 (C. Morris ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as C. Morris].
6 191 N.L.R.B. No. 135, at 3, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1494 (Board's opinion). See § 8(0(2) of the
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(0(2) (1970), which allows construction unions to require membership
after the seventh day of employment, unlike other unions which may require membership only
after thirty days of employment pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
Section 8(f) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(0 (1970), provides in pertinent part;
It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and (b) of this section for
an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry to make an
agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon their employment, will be
engaged) in the building and construction industry with a labor organization of
which building and construction employees are members (not established, main-
tained, or assisted by any action defined in subsection (a) of this section as an unfair
labor practice) because (1) the majority status of such labor organization has not been
established under the provisions of section 159 of this title prior to the making of
such agreement . . . .
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employees before they can lawfully contract with the employer.°
This is generally accomplished by means of a representation elec-
tion. A building trades union is authorized by section 8(f) to
negotiate a contract even though it has not established majority
status. However, the final proviso to section 8(0 9 provides that a
representation election questioning the union's majority status may
be called at any time by the employer, waiving the contract bar
rules which normally immunize an agreement from such challenge
for at least one year after the election which established the union's
majority. 10
Framing the issue presented by the R.J. Smith case in the
terminology of the Act, the court posed the question as
whether an employer may be guilty of an unfair labor
practice with respect to a union with which it has executed
a pre-hire contract, valid under § 8(f) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1965), to the same
extent that it may with respect to a union which has gained
recognition and secured a contract after traditional dem-
onstration of its majority support."
With regard to this issue, the court HELD: that unless and until a
representation election proves that the union represents only a
minority, the employer should be held to the same bargaining stan-
dards under a pre-hire contract as would apply in bargaining with a
certified union.' 2 In examining the legislative history of section 8(f)
the court concluded that to allow the employer to terminate unilat-
erally a pre-hire contract upon its own determination of the union's
failure to achieve majority status would frustrate Congress' purpose
in approving these special construction contracts. Such,an interpre-
tation, the court explained, would render pre-hire contracts "void-
able at will." 13 Therefore, the employer was bound by his pre-hire
agreement to bargain with the minority union until a representation
election proved the lack of majority status. Since the employer in the
instant case had not followed the statutory election procedure, the
court found that it had violated section 8(a)(5) of the Act in unilater-
ally modifying the terms of the contract, thereby refusing to bargain
with Local 150) 4
The court's holding in R.J. Smith broadly defines the scope of
section 8(f) and unfair labor practice liability thereunder. Its deci-
9 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). See generally C. Morris, supra note 5.
The final proviso to § 8(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1970), reads: "Provided
further, That any agreement which would be invalid, but for clause (1) of this subsection,
shall not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant to section 159(c) or 159(e) .. . ."
I° Sec C. Morris, supra note 5, at 162-65.
" 480 F.2d at 1187, 83 L.R.R,M. at 2707.
12 Id. at 1191, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2710.
L3 Id. at 1190, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2709.
" Id. at 1191, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2710.
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sion reverses rulings by the trial examiner and the Board which had
previously limited the application of section 8(f). The trial examiner
limited the statute's usefulness by defining the term "pre-hire con-
tract" to include only the initial bargaining agreement between an
employer and a union, excluding contracts which form part of a
continuing bargaining relationship, as were present in R.J. Smith. 15
Implicitly rejecting the trial examiner's limited definition of pre-hire
contracts, the Board found Local 150's contract to be within the
scope of section 8(1), but found that it was not enforceable in view of
the union's admitted failure to achieve majority support.' 6 The
circuit court rejected both of these theories and recognized Local
150's pre-hire contract as binding on the employer absent a represen-
tation election proving the union's failure to achieve majority
support."
This note, in analyzing the court of appeals' decision, will first
discuss the particular characteristics of the construction industry
which led Congress to adopt section 8(f). An analysis of the trial
examiner's limited definition of the statute's scope and then of the
Board's theory of limiting the force of contracts under section 8(f)
will follow. A discussion of the circuit court's rejection of these two
theories will underline the importance of its decision in preserving
the bargaining structure of the construction industry and the stabil-
ity of building trades unions. Finally, an analysis of the court's
decision in relation to the industry as a whole will lead to conclu-
sions as to the role that section 8(f) plays in the structure of collective
bargaining in the construction industry.
THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
The construction project differs from the stable regularly-
scheduled operations of other industries in several important
respects. 18 First, the individual project is immobile, tied to the
construction site determined by the customer, whereas other indus-
tries may follow the available supplies of raw materials and labor.
Second, construction is a highly complex industry. The variety of
operations on each building site requires a varied labor force with a
high proportion of skilled craftsmen. 19 The construction industry
labor force, which comprises fifteen percent of the nation's skilled
workers, 2° is divided into at least twenty different crafts and many
more specialties. 21
 Third, the industry is seasonal, the volume of
' 5 191 N.L.R.B. No. 135, at 6 (trial examiner's opinion).
'" Id. at 6, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1496 (Board's opinion).
17 480 F.2d at 1191, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2710.
'I See W. Haber & H. Levinson, Labor Relations and Productivity in the Building
Trades 10-11 (1956).
19
 Dunlop, The Industrial Relations System in Construction, in The Structure of Collec-
tive Bargaining 258 (A. Weber ed. 1961).
20 D. Mills, Industrial Relations and Manpower in Construction 4 (1972).
21 Id, at 14.
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business varying greatly because of climatic conditions. Fourth, the
possibility of greater economic gain has encouraged specialization by
contracting firms. The specialized contractor must be ready and able
to expand or contract operations or move to another geographical
area as the market conditions change. These distinguishing features
have greatly affected employment conditions in the industry. Skilled
workers' jobs are usually of short duration. Employment is migra-
tory, moving from one construction site to the next. Many workers
change employers as often as they change jobs. 22 The union's role in
this highly flexible industry is crucial:
The craft union supports the specialization of production
by performing functions which stabilize the industry. The
union enforces standards of work and compensation, par-
ticipates in the formal training of men, refers men to work
at the contractor's request, and, in general, maintains a
level of stability in the labor market as a whole which is
adequate to allow the direct employment relationship (be-
tween individual employer and employee) to be extremely
unstable. 23
Thus the building trades union has become, in effect, an employ-
ment agency, contracting with the employer before a job has begun
and then providing skilled workers when and where the contractor
needs them, as well as negotiating standard wages and working
conditions for the employees' benefit. 24
It was along these lines that collective bargaining in the con-
struction industry was organized in the nineteenth century. By the
year 1900, the basic crafts were each organized nationally and
enjoyed "a degree of power and stability hitherto unknown in
American industry." 25 Dominant throughout the industry was the
"closed shop" in which the employer was required to hire only
members of the union with which he chose to bargain. 26 Prior to
1947, the National Labor Relations Board had refused to assume
jurisdiction over the construction industry, recognizing that building
trades unions had already developed their own particular bargaining
structure which adequately provided workers the opportunity to
organize and be heard without Board supervision. 27 However, when
the Taft-Hartley Act was passed in 1947, adding regulations against
union unfair labor practices to the pre-existing provisions of the
22
 Comment, The Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on the Building and Construction
Industry, 60 Yale L.J. 673, 677 (1951).
23 Mills, The Construction Industry, 21 Lab. L.J. 498, 504 (1970).
Fleming, Title VII: The Taft-Hartley Amendments, 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 666, 703
(1960).
25
 W. Haber & H. Levinson, supra note 18, at 30.
26 Id. at 62.
27
 See Johns-Manville Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 1, 16 L.R.R.M. 77 (1945); Brown & Root,
Inc., 51 N.L.R.B. 820, 12 L.R.R.M. 278 (1943).
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National Labor Relations Act which regulated only employer prac-
tices, the Board resigned itself to accept jurisdiction over the con-
struction industry, 28 which was now expected to comply with the
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. Under the Taft-
Hartley Act, the construction industry's use of the closed shop was
outlawed29 and the unions were expected to comply, just as any
other union, with the statutory procedures of Board-supervised elec-
tion and certification as set forth in section 9 of the Act. 3 °
The construction industry, however, could not adapt so quickly
to the rules which were applied to collective bargaining in other
industries. Representation elections presented one of the more seri-
ous difficulties. The contractor could no longer insure himself a
ready supply of labor at set wage rates before bidding for and
beginning a project, since an election among a representative
number of employees had to precede any recognition of the union as
exclusive bargaining agent. In addition, because of the brief dura-
tion of jobs and the continual variation in the size and composition
of the working crew on most construction sites, the administrative
task of holding meaningful elections even after a project was begun
involved tremendous expense and in the end was given up as im-
practicable. By 1950, NLRB General Counsel Robert Denham,
several major employer associations and the Building and Construc-
tion Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor had
all requested that the Board recognize the impossibility of holding
elections on many job sites and exempt the industry in some way
from this requirement. However, the Board did not change its
policy, thus forcing the industry to carry on as best it could in
constant violation of the Act.
In 1959, Congress decided to alleviate the situation by amend-
ing the Act. Senator Javits explained on the floor of the Senate: "We
cannot apply the Taft-Hartley law to the building and construction
field. We all know the law is not being applied in that field and we
might as well recognize the fact in the law." 3 ' Section 8(f) was
adopted to adjust the law to the realities and needs of the industry.
THE SCOPE OF SECTION 8(f): THE DEFINITION OF A
PRE-HIRE CONTRACT
Section 8(f) allows an employer and a labor union in the con-
struction industry to make a collective bargaining agreement even
though "the majority status of such labor organization has not been
Sec Plumbing Contractors Ass'n, 93 N.L.R.B. 1081, 1084 n.12, 27 L.R.R.M. 1514,
1516 n.12 (1951); Wadsworth Bldg. Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 802, 23 L.R.R.M. 1403 (1949).
29 Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 4 158(a)(3) (1970), outlaws the closed shop and
substitutes a limited form of union security known as the "union shop," in which an employee
may he required to join the recognized union after the thirtieth day of his employment.
3°
 29 U.S.C. # 159 (1970).
31 105 Cong. Rec. 6395 (1959).
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established under the provisions of section 159 of this title prior to
the making of such agreement . . ..* 32 Although the statute itself
does not make use of the expression "pre-hire contract," the term
was used in the congressional debate which preceded the passage of
section 8(f)33 and has since been regularly used to refer to contracts
made pursuant to that statute. However, the term was never clearly
defined by the legislators and has therefore been the subject of some
confusion.
The court in R.J. Smith, adhering strictly to the wording of the
statute, defined pre-hire agreements as "collective bargaining con-
tracts entered into before the union's majority status had been
certified under § 9 of the Act. 34
 Previously, however, the Board had
provided a more limited definition of the term. In Bricklayers Local
3, 35
 the Board restricted the application of section 8(f) to pre-hire
contracts defined as the initial attempt by an employer and a union
in the construction industry to establish a bargaining relationship.
Those contracts which are products of a "continuing bargaining
relationship," despite the fact that they were made without prior
certification of the union's majority status, were not pre-hire in
nature, according to the Board, and were therefore beyond the scope
of section 8(f). 36
In Bricklayers, a building trades union which had previously
made exclusive bargaining agreements with the employer, although
' it had never been certified to represent the employees pursuant to a
representation election, was negotiating for contract renewal. The
union insisted on the inclusion of a certain clause to which the
employer objected, causing a bargaining impasse. The Board found
that the union had caused this impasse over a "non-mandatory
subject of bargaining," . a practice which normally subjects the union
to unfair labor practice liability under section 8(b)(3) of the Act. 37
The union contended that it had no bargaining duties under the Act
because it was negotiating a "voluntary" pre-hire contract and was
exempted from normal bargaining duties by section 8(f). 38 As will be
32
 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1970).
33 See notes 38, 42 and 43 infra.
34 480 F.2d at 1188, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2707.
35
 162 N.L.R.B. 476, 64 L.R.R.M. 1085 (1966).
36
 The Board explained:
[T]he bargaining between AGC [the employer association] and the Union presents
the situation of a continuing bargaining relationship; a situation quite different from
that which Congress , had in mind when enacting Section 8(f)(1), to wit, an initial
attempt by a union and an employer in the construction industry to commence such
a relationship.
Id. at 478, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1086.
37 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1973).
36
 During the Senate debates over § 8(f), Sen. John F. Kennedy, indicating that he
wished to establish the legislative history on this question, stated:
It was not the intention of the Committee to require by Section 604(a) [section 8(0]
the making of prehire agreements, but, rather, to permit them; nor was it the
intention of the Committee to authorize a labor organization to strike, picket, or
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discussed below, 39 the Board had already had some difficulty
defining the relation between pre-hire contracts and various bargain-
ing rights and duties defined in other sections of the Act. Avoiding
this troublesome issue, the Board in Bricklayers simply found that
the contract in question was not a pre-hire contract at all, since it
did not represent an initial attempt to establish a bargaining rela-
tionship, and held that the union, being subject to normal bargain-
ing obligations, had committed an unfair labor practice in causing
the bargaining impasse.
The Board's limitation of the scope of pre-hire contracts in
Bricklayers is based on its understanding of the legislative history of
section 8(f). It explained that "the entire legislative history of Section
8(f)(1) is couched in terms of `prehire agreements,' a reference which
can have no meaning in the situation where, as here, the parties are
continuing an existing bargaining relationship under which em-
ployees have previously been hired."" But the Board's definition of
the term pre-hire contract upon closer examination proves contrary
to the actual congressional intent. A comparison of the terms of
section 8(f) with an alternate proposal advocated by the executive
branch in 1959 but rejected in favor of section 8(f) shows that
Congress did not intend to limit the scope of section 8(1) as the
Board in Bricklayers suggested. The administration proposal pro-
vided that pre-hire contracts were permissible only between unions
and employers who could show previous history of a bargaining
relationship between them,'" i.e., exactly the type of contract which
the Board in Bricklayers declared to be beyond the scope of section
8(f). Proponents of this bill thought that only unions who had
represented the employees before and thus were more likely to be
their preferred representatives should be exempt from the election
requirements normally applicable before a contract is signed. The
rejection of the history-of-bargaining safeguard indicates that Con-
gress meant by section 8(f) to extend the new contractual privileges
to newcomer unions and avoid awarding preferential treatment to
well-established unions. 42 It did not intend to exclude the older
otherwise coerce an employer to sign a prehire agreement where the majority status
of the union had not been established. The purpose of this section is to permit
voluntary prehire agreements.
104 Cong. Rec. 11,308 (1958).
The union contended that since Sen. Kennedy's explanation of the voluntary nature of
pre-hire contracts excluded the use of what is otherwise lawful coercion by a union to force an
employer to enter into a pre-hire contract, it also precluded the employer from invoking
normal bargaining duties under the Act and allowed a union to cause a bargaining impasse
during contract renewal negotiations. 162 N.L.R.B. at 477, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1086.
39 See text at notes 50-70 infra.
40 162 N.L.R.B. at 478, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1086.
4 $ For discussion of the administration's proposal, see 105 Cong. Rec. 1284 (1959)
(statement by the Labor Dep't); id. at 1732 (remarks of Sec'y of Labor Mitchell); id. at 6398
(remarks of Sen. Lauche); id. at 6414 (remarks of Sens. Dirksen and Saltonstall); id. at 6415
(remarks of Sen. Lauche); id. at 6431 (remarks of Sen. Goldwater).
42 Id. at 14,205 (Rep. Rayburn's Labor Bill speech).
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unions which were considered "safer" candidates for pre-hire con-
tracting.
It is true that congressmen in discussing -the proposed draft of
section 8(0 generally used the term pre-hire contract in a context
which often referred specifically to the frequent need of contractors
to make a contract for labor supplies before a project had begun and
thus before a representation election could be held." However, the
Board in Bricklayers seemed to assume that this situation occurs
only when an employer bargains with the union for the first time,
whereas in fact this is not necessarily the case. A union which
develops a stable bargaining relationship with a contractor over a
period of years may still face employment conditions dictating an
extremely flexible labor force. Employment may remain short in
duration with workers still jumping from one job site to the next as
the need for their particular skills arises. In this situation, both the
contractor and the employee continue to rely on the union to serve
as an employment agency, negotiating wages and hours before the
projects begin and, throughout the period of the contract, referring
skilled workers to the various construction sites as needed." Rep-
resentation elections might still present the same administrative
difficulties as were encountered in the unsuccessful attempts to hold
such elections in the construction industry before the passage of
section 8(0. 45 A union which develops a continuing bargaining rela-
tionship with an employer and is thus in a stable position itself
continues to make pre-hire agreements in order to deal with the
continuing employment instability."
The trial examiner in R.J. Smith adopted the Bricklayers
definition of pre-hire contracts and found that Local 150's contract,
as part of a continuing bargaining relationship, was not pre-hire in
43
 The Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare explains the
purposes of its pre-hire agreement provision as follows:
In the building and construction industry it is customary for employers to enter
into collective bargaining agreements for periods of time running into the future,
perhaps I year or in many instances as much as 3 years. Since the vast majority of
building projects are of relatively short duration, such labor agreements necessarily
apply to jobs which have not been started and may not even be contemplated. The
practice of signing such agreements for future employment is not entirely consistent
with Wagner Act rulings of the NLRB that exclusive bargaining contracts can
lawfully be concluded only if the union makes its agreement after a representative
number of employees have been hired. One reason for this practice is that it is
necessary for the employer to know his labor costs before making the estimate upon
which his bid will be based. A second reason is that the employer must be able to
have available a supply of skilled craftsmen ready for quick referral.
S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1959), reprinted in 1 Nat'l Labor Relations Board,
Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, at 424
(1959) [hereinafter cited as Legislative History].
44
 See text at notes 18-26 supra.
45 See text at note 29 supra.
46 See D. Mills, supra note 20, at 15.
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nature. 47 The trial examiner then held that since Local 150 could
not show majority support, the employer was free of any duty to
bargain which would have applied to it under a contract with a
certified union. 48 But the Board in Bricklayers had limited the
definition of pre-hire contracts in the context of a very different
factual situation and with opposite results. The Board considered
that the continuing bargaining relationship in Bricklayers qualified
the union as the "recognized bargaining agent of the employees" 49
and without questioning the union's majority status held it to bar-
gaining duties normally applicable to certified unions under the Act.
Thus the trial examiner's decision in R.J. Smith allowed an em-
ployer to unilaterally renounce its contract and the bargaining rela-
tionship it had developed with Local 150, whereas the Bricklayers
case on which the decision was based had upheld a contract made
without union certification or any other formal showing of majority
status and, in fact, had fostered the continuing bargaining relation-
ship carried on outside the regulatory scheme of recognition set forth
in the Act. As we have seen, the legislative history of section 8(f) and
the realities of the construction industry do not support the limited
definition of the pre-hire contract upon which both of these decisions
are based. However, their contradictory results serve to raise the
issue of the binding force of pre-hire 'contracts and their effect on the
bargaining duties of employers and unions in the construction indus-
try. This is the very issue upon which the Board and the court of
appeals disagreed in R.J. Smith.
THE BINDING FORCE OF PRE-HIRE CONTRACTS
The District of Columbia Circuit in R.J. Smith upheld the
validity of a pre-hire contract whether or not the union could show
actual majority support and found that the employer had committed
an unfair labor practice in unilaterally modifying the contract. The
court's decision, which is expressly applicable to all unfair labor ,
practices committed under pre-hire contracts in every
circumstance, 5° upholds the binding force of pre-hire contracts and
promotes stability in bargaining relationships as they presently exist
in the construction industry. However, the court agreed with the
Board51 that the majority status of a union under a pre-hire agree-
ment is not 'fully as immune from challenge during the contract
term as is the majority status of a union which has gained recogni-
tion and secured a contract after traditional demonstration of its
majority support." 52 Section 8(f) states in its final proviso that a
47 191 N.L.R.B. No. 135, at'6 (trial examiner's opinion).
48 Id. at 7 (trial examiner's opinion).
49 162 N.L.R.B. at 478, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1087.
5° 480 F.2d at 1191, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2710.
51 Id. at 1190, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2709.
52 191 N.L.R.B. No. 135, at 4, 5, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1494 (emphasis added).
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representation election may be called at any time, suspending the
usual year-long grace period which other unions enjoy under normal
contract bar rules found in sections 9(c) and (e) of the Act. 53
 The
Board in R.J. Smith had viewed the provision as permitting a
challenge of the union's status at any time and allowed the employer
to do so as a defense to Local 150's charges of refusal to bargain.
Reversing the Board's decision, the court of appeals explained that
the election proviso is the sole safeguard against minority unions
who might otherwise use a pre-hire contract to establish themselves
as bargaining representatives without ever being able to gain major-
ity support. 54
 In the absence of such an election, the court held that
the employer was not entitled to repudiate Local 150's contract nor
to defend itself by challenging the union's majority status in court.
An analysis of these two conflicting interpretations of section 8(f)'s
election proviso is a useful preliminary means of resolving the ques-
tion of unfair labor practice liability under a pre-hire contract.
The Board in R.J. Smith read very broad implications into the
representation election proviso, asserting that it
supplies an unmistakable guide to Congress' desire to im-
munize from liability only the preliminary contractual steps
which precede an employer's acquisition of a work force on
a project in that it expressly permits the testing of the
signatory union's majority status at any time after em-
ployees have been hired and an election might, therefore,
be conducted."
The Board assumed that since the union's majority status may be
challenged at any time, it may also be challenged in any manner,
and held that the employer was entitled to challenge the union's
status during the litigation of a charge of refusal to 'bargain. It
asserted that the effect of section 8(f) is only to exempt the parties
from unfair labor practice liability in making a pre-hire contract and
not to give force to the contract regardless of the union's failure to
achieve majority status. 56
The Board, however, offers no substantiation that its interpre-
tation of this "unmistakable guide" accurately reflects the congres-
sional intent. Throughout the congressional debates, the final pro-
viso to section 8(f) is referred to as a safeguard of employee freedom
of choice in the selection of a bargaining representative." The
emphasis is on protection of the employee and not the employer,
who is the party invoking its protection in R.J. Smith. But granting
that the election proviso must include protection of the employer as
well, what need does the employer have for such protection if he can
" 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(c), (e) (1970).
54 480 F.2d at 1191, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2710.
55 191 N.L.R.B. No. 135, at 6, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1495 (emphasis in original).
56 Id. at 6-7, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1496.
57 See, e.g., 105 Cong. Rec. 15,542 (1959) (Rep. Rayburn's Labor Bill speech).
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successfully challenge a union's majority by the simpler method of
ignoring the contract or unilaterally modifying its terms? If Congress
had intended to leave pre-hire contracts vulnerable to attack in any
form, one would expect it to make such a significant change in the
status quo explicitly. It is unlikely that Congress would leave this
important limitation to be implied from an election proviso. It is also
significant that throughout the congressional debates the election
proviso is the only procedure ever mentioned whereby employees or
their employer might be safeguarded against unwarranted imposi-
tion of minority union control under section 8(f).
There is, however, some precedential support for the Board's
holding. In NLRB v. AAA Electric, Inc.," an employer fired all of
his employees for valid economic. reasons and then, refusing to
accept union referrals as provided for in its agreement with the
union, hired non-union replacements and repudiated all obligations
under the union contract. The Sixth Circuit's decision denying en-
forcement of the contract was influenced by the deliberate slow-
down which the union workers had caused and the union's complete
lack of support once the union members were all validly
terminated." The court held that a section 8(f) agreement does not
constitute "recognition of the Union as the bargaining agent for the
employees," 60 and that there is "nothing to indicate that this section
was to be an alternate method of recognizing the majority status of
the Union involved."61
In NLRB v. Irvin62 the Third Circuit, although expressly refus-
ing to reject the reasoning of AAA Electric, 63 found a situation in
which that reasoning should not apply. This case involved an
employer's repudiation of a pre-hire contract under which the union
58 472 F.2d 444, 82 L.R.R.M. 2326 (Gth Cir. 1973).
59 The court was so influenced by the evidence of lack of good faith on the part of the
union workers and the validity of their termination that it stated:
It should be noted that even if the § 8(f) agreement were to be construed as a
recognition of the Union, the valid economic termination of all of the employees
nevertheless would result in the loss of the recognition. There is no duty to bargain
with a Union representing employees who were validly discharged.
82 L.R.R.M. at 2329. This section of the court's opinion was only summarized in the version
reported in the bound volume of F.2d. Therefore, citations to it are made only to the
L. R. R. M. version.
The administrative and judicial interpretations of § 8(f) are sparse in number and
contradictory in result. The Sixth Circuit in AAA Electric cites Davenport Insulation Co., 184
N.L.R.B. No. 114, 74 L.R.R.M. 1726 (1970), to support its interpretation, overlooking
Oilfield Maintenance Co., 142 N.L.R.B, 1384, 53 L.R.R.M. 1235 (1963), which draws the
opposite conclusion about the binding force of § 8(f) contracts. In view of the sparse and
contradictory legal support for its holding regarding § 8(f), it is unfortunate that the Sixth
Circuit did not pursue further its reasoning that there is no duty to bargain with a union
representing employees validly discharged, which it offered only as alternate grounds for its
decision.
60 82 L.R.R.M. at 2329.
81 Id.
62 475 F.2d 1265, 82 L.R.R.M. 3015 (3d Cir. 1973).
83 Id, at 1271 n.4, 82 L.R.R.M. at 3019 n.4.
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had in fact achieved majority support by operation of a union
security clause requiring workers to join the union within seven days
after beginning employment. The court recognized that in this situa-
tion the employer should not be able to use section 8(f) as an excuse
for violating his contractual obligations and held that the pre-hire
contract had binding force. The court explained that
at least where the union's role has by operation of such
clauses been brought home to the employees quite directly,
[i.e., they have been required to join the union as a condi-
tion of employment within seven days of the job's com-
mencement] and they have refrained from seeking a rep-
resentation election, an employer is not free to repudiate
his § 8(f) contract during its term."
However, acknowledging the fear of the AAA Electric court of
irresponsibly imposed minority union representation, the court
specifically limited its holding to contracts with enforced union
security clauses under which the union necessarily enjoys actual
majority support," overlooking, the problem of pre-hire contracts
incorporating union security clauses which are not enforced for
undisclosed reasons, as in R.J. Smith. Thus the Irvin court did not
consider the pre-hire contract, even if it included a union security
clause, to be "an alternative method of recognizing the majority
status of the Union . . "66
 But recognizing the effect of an enforced
union security provision, the court held that under these circum-
stances the union enjoys a presumption of majority representation
rebuttable during the contract term only by way of a representation
election. 67
At first glance, the Irvin court's willingness to uphold a pre-hire
contract in which a union security clause has in fact insured the
union majority support, but its unwillingness to extend this holding
to cover all pre-hire contracts regardless of the union's majority
status, seems to be consistent with Congress' assumption that most
unions would in fact achieve that status. The report of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, which studied the bill,
noted: "If the employer relies upon this pool of skilled craftsmen,
44
 Id. at 1271, 82 L.R.R.M. at 3019.
65
 Id.
44
 82 L.R.R.M, at 2329.
47
 475 F.2d at 1271, 82 L.R.R.M. at 3019. In the case of Dallas Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v, NLRB, 396 F.2d 677, 68 L.R.R.M. 2019 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the court in effect
applied such a presumption of majority representation when a council of unions attempted to
farce an employer to bargain with it concerning agreements to limit subcontracting even
though the employees were already represented by a union under a § 8(t) contract. The court
found a violation of § 8(b)(7)(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7Xa) (1970), which, in the
court's words, "prohibits the picketing of an employer for the purpose of compelling recogni-
tion of a labor organization where another union is already lawfully recognized and when
representation issues are in a state of statutory repose." 396 F.2d at 678, 68 L, R.R.M. at 2020
(emphasis added).
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members of the union, there is no doubt under these circumstances
that the union will in fact represent a majority of the employees
eventually hired."" It is not suggested that Congress sought by
means of section 8(1) to amend the basic concept that a union is
expected to represent a majority of the employees in a unit. Con-
gress, in fact, made specific provision for safeguarding the principle
of majority representation in the election proviso, 69 the sole
safeguard of this principle which Congress saw fit to adopt as part of
section 8(f).
In addition to the arguments set forth above which interpret the
election proviso as the only procedure envisioned by Congress to
challenge a union's majority status under a pre-hire contract, the
dangers inherent in permitting the employer to modify or rescind a
pre-hire contract by unilateral action should be recognized. The
assumption that such action allowed on the employer's own deter-
mination of the union's failure to achieve majority status would
affect only those unions which could be ousted by election anyway
underestimates the adverse effect on union stability that such a
decision might have. The court in R.J. Smith recognized .the dan-
gers involved:
Winder the Board's interpretation, an . employer, unhappy
with a pre-hire agreement, can avoid it by discouraging
union membership through flagrant unfair labor practices,
thereby insuring that the union never attains a majority.
This case illustrates that danger. Credible testimony estab-
lished that the company never intended to comply with its
labor agreements; it refused to negotiate with the union; it
gave selective pay increases; it fired its only two union
employees; and it refused to honor the contracts' hiring hall
and union security clauses."
A representation election, on the other hand, which is administered
by impartial Board officials and in which an employer is bound by
rules of impartiality set forth in the Act, 7 ' would go further toward
insuring a determination of the representation question by the em-
ployees without undue pressure by the employer.
THE ROLE OF SECTION 8(f) IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
In effect, the court's decision in R.J. Smith creates a presump-
tion of majority status of a union party to a pre-hire contract and
holds union and employer to normal bargaining duties unless the
presumption is rebutted by means of a representation election. Al-
68
 1 Legislative History, supra note 43, at 424.
" See text at note 57 supra.
78 480 F.2d at 1190, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2709.
71 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
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though the court warned "that § 8(f) does not wholly obviate the
union's heed ultimately to achieve majority status," 72 its holding
implies that the union is not necessarily expected during the term of
its contract to prove that majority status in an election and to
become certified by the Board as exclusive bargaining agent. 73
A building trades union should and will gain majority support
as the workers whom it refers to the employer are hired and begin to
work. But nothing in section 8(f) nor its legislative history indicates
that the union is expected later to petition . for an election to certify
its status and ensure the enforcement of its contract. In fact, al-
though this procedure has been open to the industry under the Act
since 1947, very few building trades unions have made use of it. 74
Employers have generally acquiesced in this practice in part,
perhaps, because this has been the pattern of bargaining in the
industry since the nineteenth century, but also because they, along
with the employees, depend upon the stability of the union for job
referrals. 75 Employers have countered the unions' strength by or-
ganizing employers' associations to match the unions' forceful posi-
tion at the bargaining table, 76 but not by attacking union contracts.
Section 8(f) has, then, been used in the construction industry as
the principal method of recognizing a union as bargaining represen-
tative, avoiding representation elections and Board certification.
The industry, it must be admitted, needs strong unions to stabilize
employment conditions, but it may be questioned whether it should
be allowed to define its own particular bargaining structure and
ignore entirely procedures which other industries are required to
follow under the Act.
Congress did not intend that section 8(f) should give the con-
struction industry free rein to preserve and develop its own bar-
gaining structure without reference to the principles of collective
bargaining as set forth in the Act. Certainly it would be unwise to
divorce the construction industry from the mainstream of collective
bargaining in American industry. For the many construction work-
ers who work periodically on non-construction jobs," operating
between two distinct bargaining structures would unduly complicate
72 480 F.2d at 1190, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2709.
73 It is possible that in some instances short-term construction workers, unable to petition
for and participate in an election during their brief employment, may be saddled with a union
which is not representative of the majority of workers. Although this situation would occur
only rarely, given the union's role in job referral, it is a possible threat to the majority
representation principle and may justify some changes in the industry's bargaining structure.
But see text at note 79 infra.
24 See D. Mills, Industrial `Relations and Manpower in Construction 30 n.I0 (1972);
Dunlop, The Industrial Relations System in Construction, in The Structure of Collective
Bargaining 261 (A. Weber ed. 1961).
75 W. Haber & H. Levinson, Labor Relations and Productivity in the Building Trades
62-63 (1956).
24 D. Mills, supra note 74, at 34.
77 See id. at 3-4.
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the employment situation. The court's decision in R.J. Smith
enables the industry to remain within the regulation and spirit of the
Act while still achieving stability in its .bargaining structure. The
principle of majority representation is not sacrificed for this stability.
The election proviso establishes a safeguard against minority con-
trol, as certification does in other industries, while section 8(f) itself
provides statutory authority for the procedure of post-recognition
elections.
The structure of collective bargaining in the construction indus-
try is not without its faults. The problem of rapidly rising labor costs
and extensive work stoppages in the 1960's was perhaps exacerbated
or caused in part by the construction unions." There are also
serious racial discrimination problems in the industry to which the
unions have contributed by their overt discriminatory policies in
referral and training." Shortcomings such as these call for action by
the legislature or by the courts. Perhaps even structural changes in
the system of collective bargaining will be called for. However, to
limit the scope of section 8(f) as the trial examiner did in R.J. Smith
or to cut short the binding force of pre-hire contracts as the Board
did might undermine the stability of the union's role on which both
employer and employees depend. Considering the flexible and un-
stable nature of employment in the industry, the court in R.J.
Smith, viewing only the particular facts of one dispute which could
have been resolved by the statutory election procedure, chose wisely
to protect the union's role in fostering bargaining stability. Any
major change in the union's position in the structure of collective
bargaining in the construction industry should be made by Congress
and should be preceded by a careful evaluation of the particular
problems encountered in that industry.
DONNA VITTER PLOTT
7g Id. at 25-27.
79 Id. at 154-58.
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